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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3040 
___________ 
 
JOSE MEJIA-ORTIZ, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A046-054-538) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 14, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, VANASKIE and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  December 22, 2011 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jose Mejia-Ortiz, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic and a permanent 
resident of the United States, petitions for review of agency decisions denying his request 
for cancellation of removal.  We agree with the respondent that we lack jurisdiction and 
will, accordingly, dismiss the petition. 
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 The Administrative Record (A.R.) reveals that the petitioner was charged with 
removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).  A.R. 456.  In response, he applied for 
cancellation of removal.  A.R. 185–91.  In an oral opinion issued March 24, 2011, 
Immigration Judge (IJ) Walter A. Durling applied standards used to guide “the exercise 
of discretion for cancellation,” A.R. 65, concluding that the petitioner “[was] unable to 
show rehabilitation []or anything but perhaps a low-level of rehabilitative potential,”  
A.R. 69 (emphasis added).  Having weighed the applicable equities, IJ Durling 
determined “that it would not be in the best interest of the United States to grant this 
application” for cancellation of removal.  A.R. 70.   
On appeal to the BIA, the petitioner argued, essentially, that the IJ had erred in his 
exercise of discretion.1
While Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal under 
   A.R. 24–29.  The BIA dismissed the appeal, as IJ Durling had 
“correctly conclude[d] that the [petitioner did] not merit cancellation of removal in the 
exercise of discretion.”  A.R. 3; see also A.R. 4 (“[H]aving similarly considered and 
weighed the adverse factors evidencing the [petitioner’s] undesirability as a permanent 
resident with the social and humane considerations presented [o]n his behalf . . . we find 
that [he] presented no arguments that would cause us to disturb the . . . conclusion that 
relief was not warranted . . . in the exercise of discretion.”).  This timely petition for 
review followed.   
                                                 
1 Petitioner’s notice of appeal to the BIA raised several additional grounds, such as the 
IJ’s failure “to consider all of the evidence in [the] case,” A.R. 53, that were not 
incorporated into his eventual agency brief.  
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8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), that jurisdiction explicitly does not extend to “[d]enials of 
discretionary relief” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); see also 
Patel v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2010).  Despite this limitation on our 
power to review cancellation-of-removal decisions, we may nevertheless address 
constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a petition of review therefrom, so long 
as those matters are colorable.  Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 The petitioner spends the majority of his opening brief arguing against the 
agency’s weighing of equities.  But the weighing of equities falls squarely within the 
heartland of processes that we cannot review: agency action resting purely on an exercise 
of discretion, rather than on, for example, an alien’s statutory eligibility for the relief in 
question.  We plainly lack jurisdiction over such a discretionary outcome.  
 The petitioner also appears to raise two additional claims for relief.  First, he 
asserts that IJ Durling “concluded that he was not eligible for cancellation of removal 
because of his aggravated felony convictions.”  We “have always had jurisdiction to 
determine our own jurisdiction by engaging in an analysis of whether an alien was 
convicted of a[n] . . . aggravated felony.”  Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 251, 253 n.4 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Yet as we observed supra, IJ Durling did not deny relief under the 
aggravated-felony bar of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3), but instead did so after a discretionary 
weighing of equities—the approach also taken by the BIA.  The petitioner also contends 
that “his crime of gun possession is not one involving moral turpitude.”  This aside 
cannot confer jurisdiction on this tribunal, as the petitioner did not raise the argument or 
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its equivalent in front of the BIA, and it is hence jurisdictionally defective itself.  Lin v. 
Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2008).  Besides, it is irrelevant whether the crime 
of gun possession is one implicating “moral turpitude”; such a determination did not 
inform the basis of the agency’s decisions, see Konan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 497, 501 
(3d Cir. 2005), and in any case, crimes of moral turpitude do not serve as a bar to 
cancellation-of-removal relief for permanent residents.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), 
with 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 
In sum, as the agency decisions were based solely on a judicially unreviewable 
exercise of discretion, and as the petitioner raises no colorable constitutional claims or 
questions of law that we would otherwise be able to address, we will dismiss his petition 
for review for lack of jurisdiction. 
